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An experiment was conducted to compare mathematical models describing 
how people combine information to form an impression of another person. Subjects 
rated how much they would like stimulus persons described by one or two 
adjectives. Subjects also reported their level of uncertainty about each evaluation. 
Models using the uncertainty measures to predict integration weights were no 
more successful than the equal weight averaging model. There was no evidence 
that extreme adjectives were given high weight. Information integration was best 
described by a model in which the more negative adjective in a pair is given 
more weight than the other adjective. B 1985 Academic press, IIIC. 
Psychologists have long been concerned with understanding how people 
combine information when making judgments about others. The traditional 
task in this research has been to rate the likableness of a stimulus person 
described by a list of adjectives. Such research has focused on algebraic 
models predicting overall evaluations from values of each separate ad- 
jective. The simplest reasonable model of information integration assumes 
that the rating of a person described by two adjectives is the average of 
the ratings of two people each described by one of the adjectives. Equations 
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for this equal weight model and six other models with which it was 
compared are listed in Table 1. 
One focus of research on information integration has been on factors 
that determine the weight given to items of information. Two general 
theoretical approaches have been applied to this problem (a) a value- 
based approach in which weight depends on the adjective’s location on 
the evaluative dimension, and (b) an uncertainty-based approach in which 
weight depends on the adjective’s power to reduce uncertainty. The 
current study compared the equal weight model with three value-based 
models and three uncertainty-based models. 
One of the earliest value-based models is part of congruity theory 
(Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955). According to the congruity model, the 
integrated impression is a weighted average of the component evaluations 
where each component is weighted by its extremity. Two other value- 
based models hypothesize that more negative adjectives are given greater 
weight. The range model (Birnbaum, 1974b) predicts that the most negative 
item of information in a description is given more weight than the other 
item(s). The negativity model predicts that weight is a negative linear 
function of value, independent of the other items in the stimulus set. 
The three uncertainty-based models examined in this study are based 
on the assumption that beliefs about likableness are probabilistic (Birnbaum, 
1973b; Wyer, 1973, 1974). They predict that some items of information 
are more informative and are given greater weight. According to two of 
TABLE 1 
THE SEVEN MODELS~ 








R, = &ri/n 
R, = ~t~lr’ilri)l~c,Ir’,I 
R,, = (wLrL + &ri)/(wL + n - 1) 
R, = X,(/c - ri)ri/Zik - r, 
R, = md 
R. = Wmi/~,)lWl~,) 
R, = %krJlC,c, 
4 = -~,Pi,h*P,, 
V” = ll.wl~i) 
Q R. is the predicted rating of a person described by n adjectives; r, is the rating of 
adjective i; r; is the rating expressed on a scale where zero represents a neutral reaction; 
rL and wL are the rating and weight given to the most negative adjective, wL > 1; k is an 
empirically determined constant; md is the mean of a belief distribution derived from the 
belief distributions of n adjectives; u, is the predicted uncertainty associated with the rating 
of adjective i or adjective set i; pij is the subjective probability that a person described by 
adjective (set) i falls in likableness category j; mi and v,, are, respectively, the mean and 
variance of the belief distribution associated with adjective i; v, is the predicted uncertainty 
in rating a person described by n adjectives; and ci is the confidence associated with the 
likableness rating of adjective i. For the range model, the summation is over all but the 
most negative adjective. Other summations are over all adjectives. 
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these models, a rating scale response describes the central tendency of 
a belief distribution. Figure 1, for example, shows a subject’s distribution 
of belief about the likableness of one person described as “nosey” and 
one person described as “perfectionistic.” The subject thinks there is a 
60% chance of disliking the nosey person very much and a 20% chance 
of disliking him or her either a little more or a little less. This distribution 
represents the subject’s implicit theory about what proportion of nosey 
persons have various degrees of likableness. The subject’s rating of the 
nosey person would be predicted to be a 2. The dispersion of the belief 
distribution affects the confidence with which a stimulus person is rated. 
Thus the subject should be more confident in rating the “nosey” person 
than in rating the “perfectionistic” person. 
According to Wyer’s (1973) concept identification model, the belief 
distributions associated with single adjectives can be assessed by self- 
report. The belief distribution for the combination of two adjectives is 
the conjunction of the belief distributions for the two adjectives. This is 
approximated by the area of overlap between the two belief distributions 
(Wyer, 1973). The overlap between the belief distributions for “nosey” 
and “perfectionistic” is illustrated in Fig. 1. The mean of this area (2.5) 
is the predicted rating of a person described by both adjectives. A measure 
of uncertainty based on information theory predicts the rater’s confidence. 
If the two belief distributions do not overlap, the rater “discounts” the 
information associated with the higher level of uncertainty. The rating 
is based entirely on the belief distribution with the lower uncertainty 












FIG. 1. Hypothetical distributions of belief about the likableness of stimulus persons 
described as “nosey” (shaded from upper left to lower right) and as “perfectionistic” 
(shaded from lower left to upper right). The overlap is shaded in both directions. 
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the judgment. This model is described by the equations in Table 1. See 
also Wyer (1973, 1974). 
The variance model hypothesizes that the rating of an adjective set is 
a weighted average of the means of the separate belief distributions, with 
each mean inversely weighted by the variance of its belief distribution 
(Bimbaum, 1973b). This model also makes predictions about the uncertainty 
associated with a rating based on several items of information (Meyer, 
1975). According to the confidence model, the rating of an adjective set 
is the weighted average of the ratings based on each adjective alone, 
with each rating weighted by the rater’s subjective confidence in making 
it. 
Note that unlike the value-based models, these uncertainty-based models 
are idiographic (Ostrom & Davis, 1979). They allow the possibility that 
different people will assign very different weights to the same adjective 
even if they rate the adjective identically. On the other hand, if uncertainty 
is closely related to value, these models could predict and explain findings 
predicted by value-based models. 
Several studies have identified deviations from the equal weight model, 
including higher weighting of negative information (Birnbaum, 1974b; 
Fiske, 1980; Kanouse & Hanson, 1972) and higher weighting of extreme 
information (Fiske, 1980; Manis, Gleason, & Dawes, 1966; War-r & Jackson, 
1975). Deviations from congruity theory have also been noted (Manis et 
al., 1966; Warr & Jackson, 1975). Consistent with idiographic models, 
Ostrom and Davis (1979) found that the weight of an adjective varies 
substantially across people. There have been no published tests of the 
variance model or the confidence model. 
Wyer (1973) tested the concept identification model by having subjects 
rate stimulus persons described by one or two adjectives, judge their 
confidence in each rating, and describe their belief distributions based 
on each adjective separately. The model predicted ratings of stimulus 
persons described by two adjectives more accurately than either congruity 
theory or the equal weight model. 
The purpose of the current experiment was to replicate Wyer’s (1973) 
study and to extend it to comparisons of the predictive accuracy of the 
seven models described above, i.e., the equal weight, range, negativity, 
congruity, concept identification, variance, and confidence models. In 
addition, attempts were made to overcome possible methodological prob- 
lems in Wyer (1973). One of these potential problems is the method of 
analysis: predicted and observed values were averaged over subjects 
before calculating measures of fit in Wyer (1973). Since averaging can 
change the form of relationships, this analysis technique may distort the 
results (Bakan, 1954; Ostrom & Davis, 1979). So measures of fit were 
calculated separately for each subject in the current study. 
The other potential problems are scale-end artifacts. Rating scales 
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restrict the range of responses that can be given. A common consequence 
is nonlinearity of the response scale, particularly for ratings of extreme 
stimuli. In order to minimize scale-end artifacts in the current experiment, 
the range of the critical stimuli was restricted to exclude the most polarized 
adjectives, and highly polarized adjectives were used as filler stimuli as 
recommended by Anderson (1982, p. 8). No such techniques were used 
in Wyer (1973). 
Method 
Subjects 
The subjects were 100 students enrolled in introductory psychology classes at Oakland 
University. Fifty subjects were randomly assigned to each of two replications, but data 
from 14 of the subjects could not be used because they had failed to answer one or more 
questions, leaving 45 and 41 subjects in the two replications. 
Procedure 
The experiment was divided into two parts. In the first part of the experiment, subjects 
were presented with descriptions of 41 stimulus persons. Each description consisted of 
one or two adjectives. Subjects were asked to judge how much they would like each person 
on a scale from 1 to 9: 1 = dislike very very much, 2 = dislike very much, 3 = dislike, 
4 = dislike slightly, 5 = neutral-neither like nor dislike, 6 = like slightly, 7 = like, 8 
= like very much, 9 = like very very much. In addition, subjects were asked to indicate 
how confident they were about each rating on a scale from 1 lo 9. The ends of this scale 
were labeled not at all confident (1) and extremely confident (9). 
In the second part of the experiment, subjects were presented with 12 adjectives and 
asked to describe their belief distributions associated with each adjective. They did this 
by estimating how many out of 100 persons described by the adjective they would like 
very very much, like very much, etc. The categories of likableness were the same nine 
used in part 1 of this experiment. 
Each participant’s instructions, stimulus materials, and response scales were included 
in a computer-generated booklet. It took each subject approximately 40 min to complete 
the experiment. 
Design and Stimuli 
There were two replications of the experiment using different subjects and partially 
overlapping stimulus sets. Twenty-five of the two-adjective descriptions were constructed 
from a 5 x 5 factorial design. One set of five adjectives used in this design was the same 
in both replications: overcritical, absentminded, solemn, forward, and witty. The likableness 
of the adjectives on Edwards’ (1967) scale from 1 to 7 were 2.13, 3.02, 3.91, 4.78, and 
5.66. The five orthogonal adjectives in Replication 1 were nosey (2.13), domineering (3.02), 
lonely (3.88), persistent (4.80), and levelheaded (5.66). The five orthogonal adjectives in 
Replication 2 were quarrelsome (2.12), nonconjident (3.02), perfectionistic (3.92), idealistic 
(4.82), and individualistic (5.66). The 10 adjectives presented to each subject in the factorial 
design were also presented singly. 
The remaining six descriptions in part 1 were extreme filler adjectives friendly (6.55), 
loyal (6.54), obnoxious (1.32), and dishonest (1.22), and extreme filler pairs, friendly and 
loyal and obnoxious and dishonest. The adjectives for the distribution task (part 2) were 
the 10 adjectives included in the factorial design and the filler adjectives friendly and 
dishonest. 
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The first two stimuli in the first part of the experiment were the extreme filler pairs. 
The first two stimuli in the second part of the experiment were the filler adjectives. The 
order of the other stimuli in each part of the experiment and the order of the two adjectives 
in each adjective pair were randomly determined for each subject. 
RESULTS 
Analysis of Variance-Likableness Ratings 
Mean likableness ratings of stimulus persons from both replications 
of the 5 x 5 design are shown in Fig. 2. These ratings were subjected 
to a 5 (adjectives common to both replications) x 5 (adjectives unique 
to each replication) x 2 (replications) repeated-measures ANOVA. If 
information integration is accurately described by an equal weight averaging 
model, all the lines in Fig. 2 should be parallel and the ANOVA should 
reveal no interactions between the two adjective factors. Instead, Fig. 
2 reveals lines that diverge to the right as value increases. The adjective 
main effects and the adjective x adjective interaction were statistically 
REPLICRTION 1 
i ! .  13 3.02 3.08 4.00 5.66 
AOJECTIVE R NORMATIVE VRLUE 
REPLICATION 2 
2.12 3.02 3.92 U.62 5.66 
ROJECTIVE R NORtlATIVE VALUE 
- 5.66 YITTY 
---- 4.78 FORYRlD 
--------- 3. 9 1 SOLEMN 
- -. 3.02 RISENY-IINOEO 
----- 2. l3 OVERCRIYICRL 
FIG. 2. Mean likableness ratings of persons described by adjective pairs. 
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significant, p’s < .OOl. Consistent with the fanlike appearance of Fig. 2, 
60% of the interaction variance was concentrated in the bilinear component. 
This interaction means that negative information was given more weight 
than positive information. 
Fit of the Models-Likableness Ratings 
The free parameters in the range and negativity models were estimated 
by a least-squares procedure. The optimal equation for the range model 
was 
Rz = .30RH + .70RL, (1) 
where RZ, RH, and RL are the ratings of a stimulus person (a) described 
by two adjectives, (b) described by the adjective given the higher rating, 
and (c) described by the adjective given the lower rating, respectively. 
The equation for the negativity model was 
R, = 2 (12.15 - t+i)ri I C (12.15 - ri) 
i I i 
using the notation of Table 1. The analysis used to estimate the free 
parameters also indicated that the range model, F(1, 2149) = 307.4, 
p < .OOl, and the negativity model, F(1, 2149) = 180.3, p < .OOl, fit 
better than the equal weight model. 
In order to test the fit of the seven models, predicted likableness ratings 
were computed for each adjective pair separately for each subject using 
each model. For the equal weight, congruity, range, and negativity models, 
these predicted ratings were based on the ratings of the adjectives sep- 
arately. For the confidence model, predictions were based on the single- 
adjective likableness ratings and the associated confidence ratings. The 
predictions for the concept identification model and the variance model 
were based on the belief distributions the subject gave for the two adjectives 
separately. 
Figure 3 shows observed ratings as a function of predicted ratings for 
the 50 pairs of stimulus adjectives (averaged over subjects) for each of 
the models. The equal weight and confidence models were approximately 
correct in the predicting ratings of combinations of positive adjectives. 
Ratings of other stimulus combinations were more negative than predicted 
by these models. The data showed similar deviations from the congruity 
predictions-but the deviations were somewhat larger for the more neutral 
adjective pairs and somewhat smaller for the extreme pairs. The concept 
identification, variance, range, and negativity models were approximately 
correct in predicting ratings of the more neutral adjective pairs. However, 
ratings of the other adjective pairs were more extreme than predicted. 
These deviations were substantially smaller for the range and negativity 
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Two indices of fit between the predicted and observed ratings were 
computed for each subject: the standard error of prediction and the 
Pearson correlation. These indices had both been used by Wyer (1973). 
Dependent t tests were used to compare the fit of the seven models. 
The results are shown in Table 2. Fisher’s r to z transformation was 
performed on the correlations before conducting the t tests. Mean z 
scores were transformed back to correlations for presentation in the table. 
Three findings are notable in Table 2. First, the best performance was 
shown by models that give greater weight to negative information. Second, 
neither the congruity model nor the uncertainty-based models outperformed 
the equal weight model. Third, the standard error of prediction was more 
sensitive than the correlation to differences among the models. This last 
finding is not surprising since the correlation coefficient is not affected 
by either the slope or intercept of the relationship. 
Analysis of Variance-Conjidence 
Mean ratings of confidence associated with the likableness ratings from 
both replications of the 5 x 5 design are shown in Fig. 4. Analysis of 
variance identified significant quadratic main effects QJ< .05) and bilinear 
interaction (p < .OOl). These effects reflect the impact of four adjective 
pairs which were rated with particularly high confidence: the combination 
of two very positive adjectives or two very negative adjectives. These 
adjective pairs stand out clearly in Fig. 4. 
Fit of the Models-Conjdence Ratings 
The variance model and the concept identification model predict the 
uncertainty associated with the likableness ratings. Uncertainty should 
be negatively correlated with confidence ratings. Pearson correlations 
among the confidence ratings and uncertainty predictions were computed 
for each subject, separately for the single- and double-adjective descriptions. 
TABLE 2 
FIT OF THE SEVEN MODELS 
Mean standard Mean 
Model error of prediction correlation 
Range 1.25” .72” 
Negativity 1.29’ .72” 
Equal weight 1.33” .73” 
Confidence 1.35’ .72” 
Variance 1 sod .68”,b 
Congruity ISId.’ .69”,’ 
Concept identification 1.54’ .64’ 
Note. Within a column, means not sharing a superscript are significantly different at p 
< .OOl. This LY level was selected to compensate for the large number of pairwise comparisons. 
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REPLICATION 1 
! .  13 3.02 3.88 U.80 5.66 
RLIJECTIVE A NORWRllVE VALUE 
REPLICATION 2 
2.12 3.02 3.92 4.92 
ROJECTIVE R NORllRTlVE VAL;IE 
- 5.66 NITTI 
---- 4.79 FORNRRO 
_-------_ 3. 9 1 SOLEMN 
- -. 3.02 RBSENT-RINOEO 
----- 2.13 OVERCRlTlCRL 
FIG. 4. Mean confidence in judging the likableness of persons described by adjective pairs 
Fisher’s r to z transformation was used before averaging and mean z 
scores were transformed back to correlations for presentation in Table 
3. The predictions of the two models were reliably correlated for both 
single- and double-adjective descriptions. The correlation between con- 
fidence and predictions of the concept identification model for the single- 
adjective descriptions was also significant. None of the other correlations 
approached significance. At their very best, the uncertainty predictions 
were weakly correlated with subjective ratings of confidence. 
DISCUSSION 
Subjects judged the likableness of stimulus persons described by single 
adjectives and by adjective pairs, and rated their confidence in each 
judgment. They also created behef distributions to describe their beliefs 
about persons described by the single adjectives. Various mathematical 
models were used to predict ratings in the two-adjective conditions from 
measures in the single-adjective conditions. 
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TABLE 3 
CORRELATIONS AMONG CONFIDENCE RATINGS AND UNCERTAINTY PREDICTIONS 
Concept Confidence 
identification subjective 
model Variance model rating 
Uncertainty prediction - - r = .ss** r= -.10* 
concept identification mode1 - r(85) = 22.65** t(82) = 2.41* 
Uncertainty prediction - 7 = .57** - r= -.os 
variance model t(85) = 12.97** - ~(82) = 1.04 
Confidence- F = .oo r = -.03 - 
subjective rating t(83) = .04 t(83) = .96 - 
Note. Correlations above the diagonal are for the single-adjective descriptions. Correlations 
below the diagonal are for the double-adjective descriptions. 
* p < .05. 
** p < ,001. 
Before discussing the major findings it is necessary to address one 
methodological limitation of the study: the dependence upon scatter plots, 
standard errors of estimates, and correlations as indicators of fit. Several 
authors (Anderson & Shanteau, 1977; Birnbaum, 1973a, 1974a) have 
pointed out that these methods (especially the correlation) are rather 
crude techniques for determining the underlying functional form. The 
strongest criticism is that it is possible for a model of the wrong form 
(e.g., additive) to fit better than a model of the correct form (e.g., mul- 
tiplicative) if incorrect assumptions are made about the scaling of the 
measures. Thus our confidence in interpreting the results depends on 
our faith in the interval scaling (linearity) of likableness and the ratio 
scaling of confidence. 
In this study, two techniques were used to avoid nonlinearities in the 
likableness measure: exclusion of extreme values as critical stimuli and 
inclusion of extreme filler items. In addition, the distribution of stimuli 
across the scale was fairly symmetric. Range-frequency theory (cf. Mellers 
& Bimbaum, 1983) suggests that a symmetric distribution facilitates linearity 
of the response scale. Because of these design features, linearity of the 
likableness scale is a very reasonable assumption. So we can be confident 
about the relative success of the range, negativity, equal weight, variance, 
congruity, and concept identification models. The ratio scaling of confidence 
is, however, quite doubtful. So we cannot be quite as confident about 
the fit of the confidence model. 
Failure of the Uncertainty-Based Models 
The confidence model, variance model, and concept identification model 
predict that items of information that individually lead to evaluations 
with low uncertainty will be given greater weight. None of these models 
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predicted ratings more accurately than the equal weight model. Two of 
the uncertainty-based models also made predictions about subjedts’ con- 
fidence in rating persons described by adjective pairs. The accuracy of 
these predictions was no better than chance. These fmdings are contrary 
to Wyer’s (1973) findings that the concept identification model (a) predicted 
ratings more accurately than the unweighted average and (b) made un- 
certainty predictions that were reliably correlated with confidence ratings. 
Three methodological differences may explain the discrepancies. First, 
Wyer (1973) used more extreme stimulus adjectives than were used in 
the current study. Their scale values ranged from 1.38 to 6.39 on Edwards’ 
(1967) scale from 1 to 7, while the scale values in the current study 
ranged from 2.12 to 5.66. Second, the current study used extreme filler 
stimuli to avoid scale-end artifacts. Because some of the stimuli in Wyer 
(1973) were themselves extreme, fillers that were more extreme could 
not be used. Thus Wyer (1973) may have found more support for the 
concept identification model because it is more accurate when a wider 
range of scale values is included or because of ceiling and floor effects 
and artifactual constrictions of highly polarized belief distributions. 
The third methodological difference between Wyer (1973) and the current 
study is that the present study calculated fit for each subject separately 
and then averaged over subjects. In Wyer (1973) the predicted and observed 
values for each stimulus were averaged over subjects before calculating 
measures of fit. When the current data were reanalyzed by that method, 
the fit of all models improved tremendously, and the variance model 
performed better than the equal weight model. Thus, averaging responses 
and predictions across subjects produced some misleading results, but 
did not lead to a replication of Wyer’s findings. 
In light of the above considerations it seems appropriate to conclude 
that the concept identification model and the other uncertainty-based 
models are not useful for predicting how people will integrate most 
impression formation stimuli (i.e., the broad middle range of scale values). 
While this does not mean that people ignore the relative informativeness 
of information, it does indicate that any gain in accuracy of prediction 
from considering belief distributions or confidence was more than offset 
by the measurement error associated with these variables. Studies reviewed 
by Slavic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1977) suggest that estimates of 
probability and reports of probability density functions are unreliable 
and strongly dependent on the method of elicitation. The weak correlations 
between the distribution-based uncertainty measures and confidence ratings 
suggest that these problems apply to the measures used in the current 
study. 
If measurement error is responsible for the failure of uncertainty-based 
models in the current study, these models should be more successful if 
differences in the informativeness of information are increased. Evidence 
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for this possibility comes from studies in which the reliability of information 
was experimentally manipulated (Birnbaum, 1976; Birnbaum, Wong, & 
Wong, 1976; Surber, 1981). In these studies, judgments were well described 
by an averaging model in which items of information were weighted by 
their reliabilities. These findings support the general category of uncertainty- 
based models. They are consistent with the hypothesis that differences 
in the perceived informativeness of adjectives in the current study were 
insufficient to overcome the effects of measurement error. 
Success of the Range and Negativity Models 
Likableness ratings were most accurately predicted by the range and 
negativity models. In these models, greater weight is given to more 
negative information. The good fit of these models is consistent with the 
results of Birnbaum (1974b), and with many other studies showing the 
high weight that is given to negative information (cf. Anderson, 1981; 
Fiske, 1980; Kanouse & Hanson, 1972; Ronis, 1980; Wyer, 1973). 
Uncertainty-based models can explain the negativity effect if negative 
information is seen as highly informative. In the current study, ratings 
of single adjectives should be negatively correlated with confidence and 
positively correlated with the distribution-based uncertainty measures. 
In fact, likableness ratings were not reliably correlated with confidence 
ratings. Higher confidence was associated with extreme ratings. But 
ratings did have the predicted positive correlations with the uncertainty 
measures, ? = .14, t(S) = 2.77, p < .Ol, for the variance model and 
r = .16, t(85) = 3.38, p < .002, for the concept identification model. 
Averaging the measures across subjects increased the correlations to .41 
(df = 13, p > .lO) and .61 (df = 13, p < .OS), respectively. These 
correlations provide modest support for an uncertainty-based explanation 
of the negativity effect. Future research on this theoretical possibility 
will require improved measures of uncertainty. 
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